学术动态前沿讲座---Channel bargaining with risk-averse retailer

Channel bargaining with risk-averse retailer

We first consider a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer where there is only one product with stochastic demand. The retailer is risk averse with Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) as her risk measure and the manufacturer is a risk-neutral agent. We model the problem as a Nash-bargaining problem where the manufacturer and the retailer negotiate about the wholesale price and order quantity. We show that there exists a Nash-bargaining equilibrium for the wholesale price and order quantity with equal and unequal bargaining power. We also find that even for the equal bargaining power between the two agents, the retailer’s bargaining power for the supply chain profit increases as she becomes more risk averse. We then extend the model to the case where demand is endogenous and can be manipulated by setting the retail price. We show that there exists a Nash-bargaining equilibrium for the wholesale price, retail price and the order quantity under equal bargaining power.

李四杰，博士，副教授，博士生导师，物流管理工程系副主任。主要从事生产运作管理、供应链管理和企业信息化方向的研究。在国际、国内核心期刊发表学术论文10多篇，主持、参与多项国家自然基金和企业管理咨询和信息化实施项目，具有丰富的企业管理咨询、信息化实施经验。